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INTERVENING CRIME

INTERVENING CRtIVIE AND LIABILITY FOR
NEGLIGENCEBy LESTER W.

FEEZER*

Assisted by A. L. FAvOUR>'
"Among the mighty store of wonderful chains that are ever forging, day and
night, in the vast ironworks of time and circumstance."
-CHARLE
DIcKENs, "The Mystery of Edwin DroodL"

N 1918 in the case of Brower v. New York Central Ry. Co.,
the New Jersey court of errors and appeals held that the
owner of goods stolen from his wagon by persons unknown, while
the driver was unconscious, as a result of a grade crossing collision,
which also killed the horse and demolished the wagon, could recover the value of the stolen goods from the railroad company
whose train negligently struck the plaintiff's vehicle. The court
said, "We are clear that the questions of negligence and contributory negligence were for the jury.... The only question that
has caused us difficulty is that of the extent of the defendant's
liability." The complaint in this action alleged that the goods
in question were destroyed, and the appellate court, having before
it the question raised by the defendant's objection to proof of
their value under this allegation, said, "We think that if they were
taken by thieves they were destroyed as far as was important to
the case."'As might be expected, there follows a discussion of proximate
cause which includes a number of the usual trite and time-worn
expressions always exhibited in opinions wherein courts articulate
and explain their decision as to how far they are willing to let a jury
go in imposing liability on a negligent defendant. In the easy cases,
which from time immemorial would have been considered within
the scope of trespass, this is a simple matter, but when a case
tFor a supplementary discussion and analysis of cases, see NOTES,
p. 666.
*Dean, Washburn College School of Law.
**Of the Arizona Bar.
1(1918) 91 N. J. L. 190, 103 Ati. 166, 1 A. L. R. 737; Contra, Whitcomb v. New York, N. H. & H. Ry. (1913) 215 Mass. 440, 102 N. E. 663;
Hillis v. C. R. I. & P. Ry., (1887) 72 Ia. 228, 33 N. W. 643. Both of
these are cases in which a passenger lost money in the course of a railway accident. There was no showing in either case as to whether it was
stolen. Both are made to turn on the duty of the carrier as bailee of personal property of the passenger and hold that no such duty is owed as
to property retained by the passenger in his own care without a showing
of gross negligence on the part of the carrier.
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involves the more extended responsibilities imposed upon wrongdoers under the action on the case and its modern application in
negligence cases the problem becomes more difficult. My readers
will remember the old illustration that if one throws a log over the
fence or wall or hedge and it strikes a person who happens to be
passing on the highway an action of trespass would lie for the
resulting injury, but if the log merely fell in the highway and a
traveller coming along thereafter fell over it without fault on his
own part, the proper action was case.
What I want to suggest by this ancient history is this: As soon
as the action on the case was established by the statute of Westminster II in 1285 and the common law recognized the possibility
of responsibility for any thing less direct than a knockout blow by a
defendant, the battle was on as to how far responsibility should go.
Discussions of this problem usually take one back to the Squibb
Case. Although the issue there was primarily whether the action
should be trespass or case there was necessarily involved the
question of remoteness since the choice of writs depended upon
this. Is it unreasonable to wonder to what extent the trouble
the courts have had in determining how far responsibility for
negligence should go, is due to the fact that they were formerly
steeped in the traditions as to forms of action and the habit of
thinking in terms of the distinction between trespass and case?
2
An interesting feature of Brower v. New York Central Ry. Co.
is that the opinion said the question of when an original wrongdoer should be exempted from damage due to intervening cause
is ordinarily a jury question. But, as you see, this court, like every
other court faced with that problem, handled it and properly so
by sending the case to the jury with authority to fix damages.
That was the very issue which brought this particular case to the
court of errors and appeals. In other words, the issue formally
posed on appeal was whether the jury might allow the plaintiff
damages for the stolen goods. The problem behind this issue was
whether the original wrongdoer ought to be subjected to the risk
of thievery and it is this question which we find articulated in
terms of proximate cause. The authorities cited by the court seem
to be rather beside the point. So much has been written about
causation, proximate cause, legal cause, intervening cause and the
like that I hesitate to say anything about it lest I add to the existing
confusion which has, to some degree, in the minds of some of the
2 (1918) 91 N. J. L. 190, 103 AtI. 166, 1 A. L R. 737.
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legal fraternity, been lessened in recent years. I shall therefore
avoid talking proximate cause except insofar as it seems to be
necessary in order to present and discuss the type of situation
suggested by my title. In general I shall endeavor to stick pretty
close to the particular problem presented to the court in the
Brower Case. It seems to me that problem is this: Shall one who
by his negligence has set a stage upon which a third person commits
a crime be responsible to the person suffering loss or injury from
the crime? 3
May I first say, however, that those who have read the various
law review articles of recent years dealing with the causation
problem should find it less fearsome than in the earlier days when
writers and judges, as well as law students, were still vainly
groping for a universal formula which would reconcile all past
cases and automatically decide all future ones. For the readers
of recent years the term, proximate cause, has come to have an
intelligible meaning inasmuch as the recent writers have made it
plain that one word is as good as another and have shown that
what is involved is a sort of legal phenomenon, viz., the application
of the judicial process to the problem of determining the extent
of tort liability. If you go back to Bingham and Jeremiah Smith
and read right through Bohlen, Beale, Edgerton, McLaughlin,
Green, Harper, Prosser, and Gregory, 4 not neglecting the Restatement,5 you will be able to study an opinion involving this problem
8
Prof. F. H. Bohlen rather recently wrote: "The earlier of two wrongdoers, even though his wrong has merely set the stage on which the later
wrongdoer acts to the plaintiff's injury, is in most jurisdictions no longer
relieved from responsibility merely because the later act of the other wrongdoer has been a means by which his own misconduct was made harmful.
The test has come to be whether the later act which realized the harmful
potentialities of the situation created by the defendant was itself foreseeable."4 Bohlen, Fifty Years of Torts (1937) 50 Harv. L. Rev. 1225, 1229.
The articles referred to are familiar to students of tort law who
have followed the legal periodicals. They are all referred to in the footnotes in two recent ones in the MINESOTA LAw REvmw, viz., Prosser, Proximate Cause in the Minnesota Court, (1936) 21 1fINNESOTA LAw RviEw 19;
Cowan, The Riddle of the Palsgraf Case (1938) 23 MINNESOTA LAw RE-

vEw 46.

52 Restatement, Torts ch. 16. "Title C. Superseding Cause" Sections
440 to 453. See especially section 448. "Intentionally Tortious or Criminal
Acts Done Under Opportunity Afforded By Actor's Negligence. The act
of a third person in committing an intentional tort or crime is a superseding cause of harm to another resulting therefrom, although the actor's
negligent conduct created a situation which afforded an opportunity to the
third person to commit such tort or crime, unless the actor at the time
of this negligent conduct should have realized the likelihood that such a
situation might be created thereby and that a third person might avail
himself of the opportunity to commit such tort or crime."
The illustration given in the comment on this section is a statement of

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

or an undecided case involving it and make sense of it, even though
you might not be able to predict how it would be or should have been
decided, by what some like to call "The better rule," or, indeed,
even in a particular state with whose previous decisions you are
familiar. By this I do not mean that you will take from any one
of these writers, or from the combination, a formula which will
solve the question of whether a defendant should be held responsible in a particular situation, but you will be able to study your
particular case in an atmosphere from which some of the fog
has been burned away and which is less bedimmed by the haze of
words cast over the whole landscape by judges and earlier writers
in their efforts, which you will new realize as futile, to reduce to
definite and certain rules and fornulas the process of judgment.
No more helpful and useful expression of the idea that the
liability for the consequences of negligence should be kept within
the bounds of common sense is to be found than the words of Mr.
Justice Paxton of Pennsylvania in the familiar case of Hoag v.
Lake Shore Ry.6 where he said, "A man's responsibility for his
negligence and that of his servams must end somewhere." One
may or may not agree with the decision in the particular case that
the verdict should have been directed for the defendant. Indeed, it
is beside the point that in this case was laid down what has been
frequently referred to as the Pennsylvania or the "natural and
probable consequences" rule of proximate cause. 7 The interesting
thing about the case is its revelation of the working of the judicial
process as indicated by the above statement and again in the same
opinion by the judge's admission that the rule as he sees it is
easy to state but difficult to apply. The sad thing about this
opinion as about so many dealing with the limitation of negligence
responsibility is that the rule is too easy to state and that because of
tradition the judge feels obliged to state a rule which when stated
will conform to what Jerome Frank would call his totem or
Thurman Arnold his folkways.
Innumerable other cases have made the same observation as to
this difficulty and have then stated their rules and then applied
the facts of the Brower case. I have the temerity to suggest that had I
been on the bench in the Brower case, familiar with the Restatement and
desirous of following and applying it in my decision, I would most certainly have sustained a demurrer to Brower's complaint or at least have
directed a verdict for the defendant railway.
o(1877) 85 Pa. St. 293, 27 Am. Rep. 653.
7
See Bohlen, The Probable or Natural Consequence as the Test of
Liability in Negligence, (1901) 47 Am. L. Reg. 79, 148; Bohlen, Studies
in Torts (1926) 1.
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them or at least stated that they were doing so, but difficulty or no
difficulty, they have reached the conclusions which no doubt seemed
to them right in the cases at hand."
Judge Andrews in his dissent in the famous Palsgraf Case
has explained what is his view of the nature of this problem of
deciding when to draw the line. He says it is a question of
practical politicsY
The theme of this paper is not proximate cause but liability for
the consequences of intervening criminal acts for which the
opportunity was at least afforded by the circumstances arising out
of an original act of negligence. Notions about proximate cause
have however been the rationale of most of the decisions involving
our present problems and therefore like King Charles' head in
Mr. Dick's petition, they will get into whatever we say about damage in negligence cases. It is my hope that my readers will refresh
themselves on the general subject by at least reading Mr. Gregory's
article.' 0 It is at least one of the latest and is perhaps the best
that has been written. Mr. Gregory, along with Dean Green and a
number of others, have at least emphasized the point that the
problem of proximate cause is that of determining the limits of
responsibility and one who keeps that clearly in mind in dealing
with the cases need not be bothered by the unfortunate connotations of the word "proximate." This word would have done
enough harm if it had only been responsible for the "last wrongdoer" rule,"' now happily seldom met in current opinions, not to
mention its other results.
Out of the great number of decisions involving problems of
,"See particularly Judge Andrews' dissent in Saugerties Bank v. Del.
& Hudson Co., (1923) 236 N. Y. 425, 141 N. E. 904. Case holding railroad
not liable for loss of money loaned on fraudulently altered bills of lading
where railroad had negligently delivered the goods without taking up the
bills of lading. Judge Andrews' dissent said, "The mere intervention of
a crime does not break the sequence of cause and effect if the crime might
reasonably have been foreseen when the original default occurred." Cardozo
and Crane concurred in the dissent.
See Benenson v. Nat'l Surety Co. note in 17 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
671.
oPalsgraf v. Long Island Ry. Co., (1928) 248 N. Y. 339, 162 N. E.
99, 59 A. L. R. 1253. "What we do mean by the word proximate is that,
because of convenience, of public policy, or a rough sense of justice, the
law arbitrarily declines to trace a series of events beyond a certain point.
This is not logic, it is practical politics."
-oproximate Cause in Negligence: A Retreat from Rationalization
(1938) 6 U. of Chicago L. Rev. 36.
"The rule which imposes the liability, if any, on the last wrongful
human actor in a chain of sequences and excuses all prior actors whose
conduct has contributed to the chain of sequences culminating in the harm.
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cause and the extent of tort liability, although of course they could
not be reconciled even if there were any useful purpose to be
accomplished in making the attempt, there are at least here and
there indications of a trend towards a realization that the "last
human wrongdoer" rule, so largely responsible for cutting off
liability of original wrongdoers in the event of intervening crime,
is losing ground. The Brower Case seems to me to break away
from the traditional attitude in dealing with intervening crime and
to indicate that the majority in the New Jersey court believed
that former rules were too narrow for modern law. There
are many evidences in various types of negligence cases that judges
feel that modern conditions call for an extension of responsibility
in tort cases, and a recognition of the inadequacy of the "last
human -wrongdoer rule." As stated by the Ohio court in holding
that an intervening human act did not bar the responsibility of the
defendant as original wrongdoer ::2
"A marked change in economic conditions during the past two
decades has presented difficult problems in proximate causation.
The ever increasing number of motor trucks and automobiles has
overcrowded our streets and highways and rendered more probable
unpredictable accidents caused by careless and negligent drivers.
To meet these conditions it seems essential to extend the liability
of the wrongful actor beyond the confines of former rules, which,
while possibly suitable at the time of their inception are too narrow
for modern law."
When one talks about former rules in the field of negligence
being too narrow for modern law, he invariably means that the
responsibility of wrongdoers in the type of case he is talking about
should be extended. He may even be recognizing as a wrong
that which has not traditionally been so treated in the courts, or,
as it is more likely to be rationalized today, a new duty has been
imposed. Neverthless, even those who believe that some former
rules are too narrow for modern law, also believe that responsibility
should stop somewhere. Mr. Justice Cardozo in McPherson v.
Buick Motor Co.:" indicated that former rules about privity as
a basis for manufacturers' liability were too narrow for modern
law, but there is no better illustration in the law of torts that
responsibility must stop somewhere than Judge Cardozo's opinion
in the Palsgraf Case. judge Andrews, whose dissent in that case
has attracted almost as much attention and who was willing to
go further in the particular instance, also indicated in clearest
"2Szabo v. Tabor Ice Cream Co., (1930) 37 Oh. App. 421, 174 N. E. 18.
13(1916) 217 N. Y. 382, 111 N. E. 1050.
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terms his recognition that responsibility must be limited by the
courts. As Mr. Gregory pointed out, Andrews would not go as
far as the English cases appear to.'"
I believe I have already hinted that the Brower Case was
unusually liberal in allowing the plaintiff to collect damages for
the consequences of an intervening crime. I have not yet said
what rules, if any, are usually employed in the intervening crime
cases. A good, simple, workable rule for limiting responsibility,
and one which would answer for the result in many of the intervening crime cases I have read, would be the "last human wrongdoer" rule. If one wishes to eliminate the futile efforts to justify
the use of such a rule in terms of proximate cause and be direct
and simple about it, this rule is a good, workable rule of thumb for
those who like it. Of course it is arbitrary, and if applied to all
the intervening crime cases, will produce results shocking to the
conscience of any court. However, this in effect is the position
taken by the dissenting judges in the Brower Case. The dissenting
opinion says:
"The collision afforded an opportunity for theft of which a
thief took advantage, but I cannot agree that the collision was
therefore the [proximate] cause of loss of the stolen articles.
Proximate cause imports an unbroken continuity between cause
and effect, which, both in law and logic is broken by the active
intervention of the criminal actor. This established rule of law is
defeated if proximate cause is confounded with mere opportunity
for crime. .

.

. This clear distinction is not met by saying that

criminal intervention should be foreseen, for this implies that
crime is to be presumed, and the law is directly otherwise."
The trouble with this statement, like all statements in the law
which purport to be universals, is that not everyone will accept
them. Hence they are not capable of being universals after all.
This seems to me to be a good illustration that even those judges
professing their loyalty and adherence to general rules, and despite
their efforts to rationalize their decisions in harmony with such
rules are nevertheless very humanly stubborn in their determination to decide cases as such, as they think those cases should be
decided.
A great many of the intervening crime cases have exonerated
the defendant from responsibility but they have not for the most
part taken the strong stand of the above quoted dissent, par14(1938) 6 U. of Chicago L. Rev. 36, 41-42. See particularly Smith v.
London & S. W. Ry. Co. (1870) L. R. 6 C. P. 14; In re Polemis and
Furness Withy & Co. [1921] 3 K. B. 560.
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ticularly the more recent ones. They have hedged in that they
have said that the original negligent wrongdoer is not responsible
for the consequence of intervening crime unless intervening crime
was foreseeable. Of this I shall have more to say.
Professor Bohlen, in discussing the problem of "What is an
independent intervening agent such as will be held to break the
chain of causation between wrong and injury," says this as to
intervening crimes:
"It is true that if the intervening act be intentional, the defendant is usually not liable, because there is normally no reason
to anticipate willful wrongdoing pf others. In exceptional situations even willfully wrongful acts of others are normal and
expectable."1"
The more one considers this question of responsibility for
intervening crime and the more cases one reads involving it, the
more evident it becomes that in every such case the basic question
is one of policy. To restate it: "Is it the policy of this court
that a negligent person shall bear the risk that a third person will
take advantage of the opportunity afforded by such negligence to
commit a crime?" Some courts answer this in the negative for
the reason that crime is not foreseeable or expectable, or whatever other term serves to express the same idea. Too often this
is put in terms of proximate cause, as, for example, that the
negligent act is not the proximate cause of the result complained
of, or that the consequence is too remote. May I say again, at the
risk of seeming repetitious, or of harping too much upon what may
seem elementary, that there is no question of causation involved
here and that when liability is denied, the decision usually has no
relation to remoteness either of time or space in the particular
case. Other courts say that whether the crime in the particular
instance constitutes a superseding cause depends upon whether
laBohlen, Studies in Torts (1926) 505 (footnote). Mr. Bohlen in this
footnote continues: "The liability of a negligent defendant is carried to a
great length in the recent case of De La Bare v. Pearson, [1907] 1 K. B.
483, where a newspaper proprietor is held liable to a subscriber whose
money has been stolen by a broker, an undischarged bankrupt, to whom it
had been entrusted by the subscriber for investment on the recommendation
of the financial editor, who had taken no pains to ascertain the true character of the broker, of which however he did not actually know. While this
is the tendency of modern cases, the rule of Vicars v. Wilcocks, (1806),
8 East 1, still occasionally crops up as a refuge to a court wishing in
a hard case to relieve some unfortunate rather than morally wrongful delinquent from the extreme burden of full liability for all the actually proximate
results."
'Note how Mr. Bohlen here uses the word "proximate" not as a term
of a formula for limiting liability but as a description of any consequence
to which an actor's wrongful conduct may have contributed.
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it was reasonably foreseeable. Assuming you have a jurisdiction
which admits the possible existence of cases wherein intervening
crime may be foreseeable, then the real trouble begins. Is the
foreseeability of crime a question for the court or for the jury,
or is it a mixed question of law and fact, or sometimes one and
sometimes the other, and, if and when it may call for a jury determuination, under what sort of instructions is it to be submitted?
Here we encounter as in every negligence case the whole gamut
of techniques employed in the process of the division of labor,
power, and responsibility under the jury system.
I have tried out the layman's idea as to what is fair and just
in these cases by putting to a number of people both individually
and in groups a number of the fact-situations in the intervening
crime cases, and I found that on the whole there seems to be a
pretty definite tendency at the first reaction to feel that the first
wrongdoer should not be held liable for what the criminal does.
Then upon trying out their reaction to the foreseeability idea by
a few questions as to the reasons for the everyday precautions
again'st theft, such as locks, burglary insurance, and to go further,
fidelity bonds, check protectors and other precautions against
dishonesty, I seemed to be getting a reaction which tended to
distinguish as to foreseeability between crimes of misappropriation
of property and crimes of violence against the person. I also
discovered that if your guinea pig is a thoughtful one, and if you
put to him a mere skeleton situation, he soon begins to ask
questions as to additional facts which soon results in throwing
the duty problem in your lap.
When will the law require the negligent actor to foresee the
possibility of crime? Where does duty come in here? The foreseeability of harm being the recognized test of negligence, it may
well be that in some cases the recognition that the conduct of the
defendant in creating a situation where, as a reasonable man, he
should foresee the possibility and/or probability of such opportunity being taken advantage of for the commission of a crime,
foreseeability may become the basis of liability irrespective of any
question of legal or proximate cause.""
The Torts' Restatement' 7 provides for this aspect of our problem in the following statement:
1Cln other words the problem is again, or still, the practical one of
adopting a policy as to limiting responsibility, viz, judge Andrews' "practical
politics" previously referred to.
'17Section 449.
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"If the realizable likelihood that a third person may act in
a particular manner is the hazard which makes the actor negligent,
such an act, whether innocent, ne.gligent, intentionally tortious or
criminal, does not prevent the actor from being liable for harm
caused thereby."
This section taken by itself is helpful but the comment, particularly the illustrations which are taken from cases familiar to
any one who has read the intervening crime cases, seems to indicate a separation between the cases covered by sec. 448 and those
coming under sec. 449 which is more apparent than real. It is
impossible to tell from the cases themselves which impose liability-whether such liability is imposed because it was the expectability of crime which made defendant's conduct negligent and
when it was done because the consquences of the intervening crime
were within the limits of responsibility of the defendant for his
negligent acts. We are not told in many of the cases which impose
liability why the defendant was negligent. However, in a later section1" the Restatement does tie these matters together again by saying, "The rules stated in sections 430 to 453 as determining the
causal relation necessary to liability are as fully applicable to establish the extent of liability as to establish its existence." This is the
sort of vain thing which has done so much to bring the Torts
Restatement into disrepute and which has a tendency to destroy
the benefit of the recent and rather good writing about proximate
cause which has already been referred to. Taking the whole title
on superseding cause as it appears in the Restatement, the reader
is left in greater confusion than if he had not read it.
For two reasons this paper will not undertake to contribute
anything original on this aspect of the subject under discussion.
The first reason is the article, The Duty to Control the Conduct
of Another, by Messrs. Harper and Kime 9 and the second is Mr.
Eldredge's article on Culpable Intervention as Superseding
Cause."0
Many of the cases which do impose liability on a negligent
defendant for the consequences of crime for which his negligence
created an opportunity, may be explained on the basis of the thesis
of the Harper & Kime article. However, that article is not confined to a discussion of the intervening crime cases. The points
m-de in the Harper & Kime article are: First, there are relation18Section 454.
19(1934) 43 Yale L. J. 886.
20(1937) 86 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 121.
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ships between parties which impose upon one of such parties a
duty to act or to take precautions to prevent the other party to the
relation from engaging in acts or omissions which will injure
third parties. (Note this is exclusive of the ordinary respondeat
superior situation.) Second, there are relations which impose
upon one of the parties the duty to protect the other party to the
relation against harms by third persons. By relationship between
parties, as treated in this paper, is meant something more specific
and less tenuous than the general concept of a right duty relation
as based upon the foreseeability of harm.2 ' I mean that concept
which found one of its early and classic expressions in that oft
22
quoted passage from Heaven v. Pender.
"Whenever one person is by circumstances placed in such
a position with regard to another that everyone of ordinary sense
who did think would at once recognize that if he did not use
ordinary care and skill in his own conduct with regard to those
circumstances he would cause danger of injury of the person or
property of another, a duty arises to use ordinary care and skill
to avoid such danger."
To be sure, this formula includes the particular relationships
which Harper and Kime discuss, but, as it has ordinarily been
interpreted, it means more. It is taken usually as a definition of
negligence. However, these writers, as I understand them, find
that the cases within the scope of their investigation, notwithstanding the more particular relations involved, really do raise a
duty because the party upon whom the liability is imposed was in
a situation where, as a reasonable person, he could foresee harm
to one person through this failure to control another and has
failed to use reasonable care to exercise such control. 2 The
article includes reference to a great many of the leading inter21
The subheadings in the above mentioned article which indicate the
"special relations" there considered are as follows; "Another use of Defendant's Chattel in his presence." "Relationship of Parent and Child,"
"Other Cases Where Defendant Has Special Ability to Exercise Control over Another." "Persons under Special Protection of Defendant,"
"Carrier and Passenger," "Use of Land by Business Visitors."
At page 905 Messrs. Harper and Kime say: "Human beings by their
activities have all sorts of dealings with each other and come into all sorts
of relations. Some of them are tenuous, and to them the law attaches no
special obligations. Others are regarded as of sufficient importance to require for a sound and stable social order, certain assurances of safety to
persons and property on the part of parties thereto. The social policies
which determine what relations require such special assurances and what
ones are sufficiently unimportant not to require them are so incredibly
complicated as almost to defy analysis."
22(1883) L. R. 11 Q. B. Div. 503.
2 See note 21 supra, Messrs. Harper and Kime Subheadings.
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vening crime cases but is primarily concerned with the problem
of duty to control one person and so to protect another from the
consequence of acts of the former, whether criminal or not.
This duty of control based upon special relationship is best
explained by illustration as the writers state at page 897:
"An obvious application of the principle would appear to be
situations where the defendant has control over another who is
by reason of some social or mental maladjustment a dangerous
person. Thus those in charge of penitentiaries
24 or insane asylums
would seems clearly to come within this rule."
The second of the articles mentioned above, by Mr. Eldredge,
deals more directly with the general topic of this paper; however,
Mr. Eldredge has aimed at a broader target in that he is concerned with the liability of an original negligent wrongdoer for
the consequences of all kinds of subsequent culpable interventions. Mr. Eldredge has made it unnecessary for me to say much
of what I should otherwise have wanted to mention in this paper.
In the first place he has traced the history of the legal thinking
(or writing) which documented the extensive prejudice against
imposing liability in situations like the Brower Case. He has presented the vicious doctrine of Vicars v. Wilcocks2 5 the "last human
wrongdoer" rule in all its meanness and has shown that in general the American courts today are at least showing an increasing willingness to impose liability on a negligent defendant for
the consequences of human intervention whether innocent or
criminal, if such intervention is foreseeable. Mr. Eldredge has
also shown very clearly, giving his reasons, which are acceptable,
but which I shall not extend this paper by repeating, that the
problem of causal relation in fact is in these cases, as in most
24The most frequently cited case illustrative of this is Austin Jones
Co. v. Maine, (1923) 122 Me. 214. 119 Atl. 577 in which the state
was held liable in an action of tort when the head of a state institution
for the treatment and custody of the insane negligently released a patient
who thereafter set fire to the plaintiff's building (under a consent statute).
Contra: Cappel v. Pierson, (1931) 15 La. App. 524, 132 So. 391 which
refused to impose liability upon the superintendent of an insane hospital
who negligently released an incurable homicidal maniac who shortly killed
plaintiff's husband. Noted 45 Harv. L. Rev. 192 and in accord with this
latter case see Henderson v. Dade Coal Co., (1897) 100 Ga. 568, 28 S. E.
251, 40 L. R. A. 95, which refused to hold the contract employer of convict labor when such employer negligently allowed a known rapist to escape
and who thereafter raped the plaintiff (the convict, not the contractor,
raped the plaintiff). Also accord with last case and on similar facts. Tennessee v. Ward and Briggs, (1871) 9 Heisk, (Tenn.) 100.
25(1806) 8 East 1. Defendant's slander caused plaintiff's employer to
discharge him. Held: the intervening act of the employer after the act of
defendant relieved the defendant of liability. See comments on this case
by Mr. Bohlen in the essay referred to in note 15 supra.
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negligence cases, very simple. Only doubtful questions of fact
can be thrown to the jury under instructions embodying the substantial factor rule, as first stated by Jeremiah Smith, reiterated
and employed in recent years in a great number of decisions and
finally included in the Restatement of Torts. Jurisdictions not
liking the "Substantial Factor" formhula may readily substitute
some other as found in their own previous decisions.
As always when the ritual of proximate cause is performed
the real problem is that of determining the limits of responsibility, or, as Mr. Eldredge put it, "That of determining how far
shall society go in making the defendant pay for consequences
when his conduct has been a substantial factor in producing the
plaintiff's loss or injury."
Mr. Eldredge's argument is essentially this:
"We are dealing with a man who is admittedly a wrongdoer,
a man whose breach of duty the plaintiff has found to be a substantial factor in causing plaintiff's harm. Normally the plaintiff is entitled to have such a man pay for it. Under such circumstances the intervening conduct should be extraordinary indeed before the defendant is permitted to escape liability. Opinions
will differ as to what sort of intervening negligence [from the
context I am sure he means here to include crimes and other intentional human interventions as well] is extraordinary and unexpectable."20
Much as I like what Mr. Eldredge has to say, in the main, I
find his argument unsatisfactory in that he would predicate the
more extended responsibility of defendants on breach of duty
to the plaintiff. It seems to me that this is begging the question.
The problem of the "intervening human act" cases, like all the
negligence cases which we so frequently find stated in terms of
cause, is that of defining duty and remains as indefinite and as
illusive as everyr Let us start, as probably most authorities
would approve, with the generalization that a negligent wrongdoer is responsible for the consequences of intervening crime
wherever such crime is reasonably foreseeable. The difficulty is
that this does not alone solve the cases. If we attempt to be more
specific the rule becomes dangerously narrow, and if we take out
the requirement of reasonable foreseeability it becomes too broad.
213(1937) 86 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 121, 134.

-7Here again we are obliged to face the problem of what is negligence
and, secondly what are the limits of responsibility? The "foreseeability of
harm" test of negligence is so inextricably mixed up with the problem of
fixing limits of responsibility that the courts all too frequently fall into the
pitfall of defining the latter (which does not need to be defined but only
decided in each particular case), in terms of the former.
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The problem at this point then becomes one of administration, of
allocating the relative functions of judge and jury.
At this point I should like to tell the reader what I think I
have said so far:
1. Talking about proximate cause will not properly decide
cases involving the liability of the negligent man for crimes committed by others in the fields of opportunity therefor which his
negligence has opened.
2. There is nothing in the general concepts of the law of negligence which would forbid a court from imposing liability in
such cases.
3. The foreseeability idea, while accepted as a test of the
existence of negligence, has to a large degree been abandoned as
a test for determining the limitations of responsibility for negli28

gence.

4. But in connection with intentional intervening acts of third
persons, most courts profess to limit the original wrongdoer's
responsibility to cases where such intervention was expectable and
some are even more strict on the theory that crime is never expectable.
5. It cannot fairly be said as . matter of law, and should not
be categorically laid down, that crime is entirely unexpectable in
any situation where the stage set by the original wrongdoer's
negligence affords an opportunity for crime to any person with
criminal impulse who may happen to appear on the scene.
6. On the other hand, the probabilities of crime intervening
in every case of negligence are not so great that the negligent
man should invariably be burdened with this risk.
7. Special relations such as those discussed by Messrs. Harper
and Kime are another story, and cases involving them must be
solved and decided in the light of special duty factors there
present.
8. A court desiring in a particular instance to give the jury
a free hand to award or refuse damages in such instances may
do so by framing its instructions on the basis of foreseeability of
the possibility of crime under the circumstances.
2
8If the court, applying the danger or foreseeability test, believes that
there is evidence upon which reasonable minds might differ, etc., and lets
the jury have the case it has indicated its belief that the harm alleged is
the sort of harm which is within the scope of the risk to liability which
the defendant has assumed by his dangerous conduct and has further indicated that consequences complained of are within its policy as limits
of responsibility.

INTERVENING CRIME

9. Finally, the court cannot and does not escape the responsibility of determining the existence of such a relation between
plaintiff and defendant as may be called a duty but which in any
event recognizes a policy casting upon the defendant the risk of
29
criminal intervention.
The court has obviously undertaken the entire burden when
there is a directed verdict or other disposition taking the whole
matter out of the hands of the jury.
Equally so the court has decided questions of duty and policy
when it sends the cases to the jury under instructions in whatever form involving the essential questions: (a) Was the defendant's conduct a substantial factor in causing plaintiff's harm
(by creating any opportunity for intervening crime)? (b) Was
the foreseeability or expectability of such crime as was committed sufficiently real so that the defendant should be burdened
with the risk? (This last seems to leave the duty problem to the
jury but it does not even where the jury has the opportunity to
bring in a general verdict.)
In framing the issue for the jury in such cases it makes no
difference whether the word "duty" is used or not. Duty is a
lawyer's word in these circumstances and will be of little help to
the jury. By electing to turn over to the jury the final decision of damages or no damages the court has assumed the existence of what lawyers call "duty and proximate cause." On the
other hand, if the court disposes of the case, it is the inescapable
inference that it did not see such a duty, or to put it another
way, did not recognize it as a policy of the law that such risks
should be imposed as one of the penalties of negligence.
Always there is the possibility that the evidence may be so
clear that, as we lawyers put it, "reasonable minds cannot differ,"
then the court takes the same responsibility with perhaps only the
added one of damages, although this is usually referred to a
jury or settled by agreement between the parties.
The final guide which courts will always have in mind, whether
expressed or not and in spite of more elaborate formulas, will
be the reasonable conservatism of Mr. Justice Paxton's sobering
caution: "A man's responsibility for his negligence and that of
his servants must end somewhere."30
20
Torts Restatement section 453: "It is the exclusive function of the
court to declare the existence or non-existence of rules which restrict the
actor's responsibility short of making him liable for harm which his
negligent conduct is a substantial factor in bringing about and to determine
the circumstances to which such rules are applicable."
8OHoag v. Lake Shore Ry., (1877) 85 Pa. St. 293, 27 Am. Rev. 653.
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It should be noted in a great many of the automobile accident cases; where the question arises as to liability as between
two or more defendants and also where the question involves
contributory negligence, that ore or both of the parties were
violating a traffic regulation of some sort and therefore subject
to criminal prosecution. In civil actions in tort, however, the
question presented is almost always whether the party whose
negligent conduct is alleged to have broken a chain of causation
was negligent. The fact that he may have been acting in violation of an ordinance or statute is usually treated as significant
only for the purpose of determining whether his conduct was or
was not negligence per se. It does not seem to be taken account
of, as are intentional intervening acts, whether criminal or not.
'The discussion of negligent intervening acts even though they
violate statutes or ordinances is not within the scope of this paper.

